

Como garantir proteção de dados pessoais no seu projeto

Apresentação

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- Recife, Brazil     
- Formada em Engenharia da Computação
- Aluna de mestrado da [Universidade de Pernambuco](#) 





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Como garantir proteção de dados pessoais no seu projeto


**Não é só substituir
nomes...**

NETFLIX

Netflix Prize

COMPLETED

Home Rules Leaderboard Update



[FAQ](#) | [Forum](#) | [Netflix Home](#)

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Netflix Prize

WHY 'ANONYMOUS' DATA SOMETIMES ISN'T

LAST YEAR, NETFLIX published 10 million movie rankings by 500,000 customers, as part of a challenge for people to come up with better recommendation systems than the one the company was using. The data was anonymized by removing personal details and replacing names with random numbers, to protect the privacy of the recommenders.

Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov, researchers at the University of Texas at Austin, de-anonymized some of the Netflix data by comparing rankings and timestamps with public information in the [Internet Movie Database](#), or IMDb.

Their [research \(.pdf\)](#) illustrates some [inherent security problems with anonymous data](#), but first it's important to explain what they did and did not do.

They did *not* reverse the anonymity of the entire Netflix dataset. What they did was reverse the anonymity of the Netflix dataset for those sampled users who also entered some movie rankings, under their own names, in the IMDb. (While IMDb's records are public, crawling the site to get them is against the IMDb's terms of service, so the

Fitness tracking app Strava gives away location of secret US army bases

Data about exercise routes shared online by soldiers can be used to pinpoint overseas facilities

- **Latest: Strava suggests military users 'opt out' of heatmap as row deepens**



▲ A military base in Helmand Province, Afghanistan with route taken by joggers highlighted by Strava. Photograph: Strava Heatmap

Sensitive information about the location and staffing of military bases and spy outposts around the world has been revealed by a fitness tracking company.



[EXCLUSIVO] Detran vaza dados pessoais de quase 70 milhões de brasileiros

👤 Liliane Nakagawa 📅 08/10/2019 🕒 17h10

**Anonimização é
possível?**

Your Data Were ‘Anonymized’? These Scientists Can Still Identify You

Computer scientists have developed an algorithm that can pick out almost any American in databases supposedly stripped of personal information.

[The Times](#)

Researchers spotlight the lie of 'anonymous' data

Natasha Lomas @riptari / 7:30 am -03 • July 24, 2019

 Comment



Researchers from two universities in Europe have published a method they say is able to correctly re-identify 99.98% of individuals in anonymized data sets with just 15 demographic attributes.

[TechCrunch](https://techcrunch.com)

Sim

Outline

- Regulamentações
- Pseudonimização (bem rápido)
- Anonimização
 - k-Anonimato (k-Anonymity)
 - Privacidade Diferencial (Differential Privacy)



START
HERE...

EU General Data Protection Regulation

Privacy by Design




Pseudonimização

Pseudonimização

Dados pseudonimizados ainda **são considerados dados pessoais**, pois podem ser usados para **re-identificação** se combinados com **informações adicionais**.

Pseudonimização

- Data Masking
- Approximation
- Encryption
- Tokenization



```
class AbstractUser(AbstractBaseUser, PermissionsMixin):
    username_validator = UnicodeUsernameValidator()
    username = models.CharField(
        _('username'),
        max_length=150,
        unique=True,
        help_text=_('Required. 150 characters or fewer. Letters, digits and @/./+/-/_ only.'),
        validators=[username_validator],
        error_messages={
            'unique': _("A user with that username already exists."),
        },
    )
    first_name = models.CharField(_('first name'), max_length=30, blank=True)
    last_name = models.CharField(_('last name'), max_length=150, blank=True)
    email = models.EmailField(_('email address'), blank=True)
```

```

class AbstractUser(AbstractBaseUser):
    username_validator = UsernameValidator(
        username=models.CharField(
            _('username'),
            max_length=150,
            unique=True,
            help_text=_('Required. 150 characters or fewer. Letters, digits and @/./+/-/_ only.'),
            validators=[username_validator],
            error_messages={
                'unique': _("A user with that username already exists."),
            },
        ),
    )
    first_name = models.CharField(
        max_length=30,
        blank=True,
    )
    last_name = models.CharField(
        max_length=30,
        blank=True,
    )
    email = models.EmailField(
        blank=True,
    )

```

THE TOKEN OBJECT

```

{
  "id": "tok_1F7Xn02eZvKYlo2C80cAAActP",
  "object": "token",
  "card": {
    "id": "card_1F7Xn02eZvKYlo2CfJ7Z3z0x",
    "object": "card",
    "address_city": null,
    "address_country": null,
    "address_line1": null,
    "address_line1_check": null,
    "address_line2": null,
    "address_state": null,
    "address_zip": null,
    "address_zip_check": null,
    "brand": "Visa",
    "country": "US",
    "cvc_check": null,
    "dynamic_last4": null,
    "exp_month": 8,
    "exp_year": 2020,
    "fingerprint": "Xt5EWLLDS7FJjR1c",
    "funding": "credit",
    "last4": "4242",
    "metadata": {},
    "name": null,
    "tokenization_method": null
  }
}

```

```
and @/./+/-/_ only.'),
```

```
(True)
(rue)
```

pseudonymization django



 FILTER



DjangoCon US 2018 - Pseu, Pseu, Pseudio. Pseudonymization in Django. by Frank Valcarcel

DjangoCon US • 210 views • 9 months ago

DjangoCon US 2018 - Pseu, Pseu, Pseudio. Pseudonymization in Django. by Frank Valcarcel The General Data Protection ...

CC

Anonimização

Dados anônimos **não contêm informações** que possam **potencialmente identificar** um indivíduo e **não são considerados dados pessoais** pela GDPR

Abordagens

- Anonimização Estática
- Anonimização Dinâmica
- Dados sintéticos

Abordagens

- Anonimização Estática
- Anonimização Dinâmica
- ~~Dados sintéticos~~

Anonimização de uma base de dados

- Anonimização **estática**
- Alterar dados **destrutivamente diretamente** no banco de dados
- Compartilhar com **third parties**
- Criar um ambiente de **teste seguro**

Anonimização de uma base de dados

Django administration

WELCOME, REBECA. [VIEW SITE](#) / [CHANGE PASSWORD](#) / [LOG OUT](#)

Home › Users › Users

Select user to change ADD USER +

Action: 0 of 5 selected

<input type="checkbox"/>	FIRST NAME	LAST NAME	EMAIL ADDRESS	USERNAME
<input type="checkbox"/>	Taylor	Swift	taylor@fake.com	tswift13
<input type="checkbox"/>	Ed	Sheeran	ed@fake.com	teddy
<input type="checkbox"/>	Phil	Collins	philcollins@fake.com	phil
<input type="checkbox"/>	Caetano	Veloso	caetano@fake.com	caetano
<input type="checkbox"/>	Rebeca	Sarai	rebeca@vinta.com.br	rsarai

5 users

Anonimização de uma base de dados

```
class AbstractUser(AbstractBaseUser, PermissionsMixin):
    username_validator = UnicodeUsernameValidator()
    username = models.CharField(
        _('username'),
        max_length=150,
        unique=True,
        help_text=_('Required. 150 characters or fewer. Letters, digits and @/./+/-/_ only.'),
        validators=[username_validator],
        error_messages={
            'unique': _("A user with that username already exists."),
        },
    )
    first_name = models.CharField(_('first name'), max_length=30, blank=True)
    last_name = models.CharField(_('last name'), max_length=150, blank=True)
    email = models.EmailField(_('email address'), blank=True)
    is_staff = models.BooleanField(
        _('staff status'),
        default=False,
        help_text=_('Designates whether the user can log into this admin site.'),
    )
    is_active = models.BooleanField(
        _('active'),
        default=True,
        help_text=(
            'Designates whether this user should be treated as active. '
            'Unselect this instead of deleting accounts.'
        ),
    )
    date_joined = models.DateTimeField(_('date joined'), default=timezone.now)
```

Anonimização de uma base de dados

```
from dj_anonymizer import anonym_field
from dj_anonymizer.register_models import AnonymBase, register_anonym, register_skip
from faker import Factory
fake = Factory.create()

class UserAnonym(AnonymBase):
    email = anonym_field.string('{seq}@fake.com', seq_callback=datetime.datetime.now)
    username = anonym_field.string('username_{seq}@fake.com', seq_callback=datetime.datetime.now)
    first_name = anonym_field.function(fake.first_name)
    last_name = anonym_field.function((fake.last_name))
    password = anonym_field.password('password')
    is_staff = anonym_field.function(lambda: False)
    ssn = anonym_field.function(fake.ssn)

    class Meta:
        queryset = User.objects.exclude(id=1)
        exclude_fields = ['is_active', 'is_superuser', 'last_login', 'date_joined',
                          'avatar', 'phone_number', 'birth_date', 'bio']

register_anonym([
    (User, UserAnonym),
])
register_skip([
    ContentType, Group, Permission, LogEntry, Session,
])
```

Anonimização de uma base de dados

```
✓ 21:02:57 rsarai:~/github-projects/anonymization/data-privacy/jane_doe_project (master) [2 days ago] ↵
$ ls
anonymizer/ anonymizingdb db.sqlite3 jane_doe_project/ janedoe janedoeproject manage.py* users/
✓ 21:02:59 rsarai:~/github-projects/anonymization/data-privacy/jane_doe_project (master) [2 days ago] ↵
$ python manage.py anonymize_db --action anonymize
Updating started

Generating fake values for model "User"

Updating finished
=====
Total time (sec.): 0.3125114440917969
✓ 21:03:12 rsarai:~/github-projects/anonymization/data-privacy/jane_doe_project (master) [2 days ago] ↵
$ exit
exit
```

Anonimização de uma base de dados

Django administration

WELCOME, **REBECA**. [VIEW SITE](#) / [CHANGE PASSWORD](#) / [LOG OUT](#)

Home › Users › Users

Select user to change ADD USER +

Action: 0 of 5 selected

<input type="checkbox"/>	FIRST NAME	LAST NAME	EMAIL ADDRESS	USERNAME
<input type="checkbox"/>	Gregory	Weber	2019-09-27-202724768178@fake.com	username_2019-09-27-202724844626@fake.com
<input type="checkbox"/>	Amanda	Fisher	2019-09-27-202724691381@fake.com	username_2019-09-27-202724768091@fake.com
<input type="checkbox"/>	Alexander	Shepard	2019-09-27-202724614664@fake.com	username_2019-09-27-202724691293@fake.com
<input type="checkbox"/>	William	Mccoy	2019-09-27-202724532248@fake.com	username_2019-09-27-202724614576@fake.com
<input type="checkbox"/>	Rebeca	Sarai	rebeca@vinta.com.br	rsarai

5 users

Anonimização de uma base de dados

- [di_anonymizer](#)
- Mantém a **estrutura dos dados**
- **Performance**
- Anonimização deve ser **definida precisamente**
- Sujeito a ataques de **background knowledge**
- Os dados geralmente são apenas pseudonimizados

k-Anonymity

- 1º método proposto para anonimizar microdata
- Tem como objetivo criar **grupos** com pelo menos k registros compartilhando os mesmos valores de **quase-identificadores**
- Generalização e Supressão

k-Anonymity: Comportamento

Single	20
--------	----

	ID	QIDs			SA
Tuple#	Name	Marital Stat	Age	ZIP Code	Crime
1	Joe	Separated	29	32042	Murder
2	Jill	Single	20	32021	Theft
3	Sue	Widowed	24	32024	Traffic
4	Abe	Separated	28	32046	Assault
5	Bob	Widowed	25	32045	Piracy
6	Amy	Single	23	32027	Indecency

k-Anonymity: Comportamento


Single	20
--------	----

Jill roubou alguém

	ID	QIDs			SA
Tuple#	Name	Marital Stat	Age	ZIP Code	Crime
1	Joe	Separated	29	32042	Murder
2	Jill	Single	20	32021	Theft
3	Sue	Widowed	24	32024	Traffic
4	Abe	Separated	28	32046	Assault
5	Bob	Widowed	25	32045	Piracy
6	Amy	Single	23	32027	Indecency

k-Anonymity: Comportamento

- Usando o algoritmo de Mondrian
- **Particiona** o espaço do domínio em várias regiões




k-Anonymity: Comportamento

- Usando o algoritmo de Mondrian
- **Particiona** o espaço do domínio em várias regiões

	ID	QIDs			SA
Tuple#	Name	Marital Stat	Age	ZIP Code	Crime
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4	Abe	Separated	28	32046	Assault
5	Bob	Widowed	25	32045	Piracy
6	Amy	Single	23	32027	Indecency

k-Anonymity: Comportamento

- Usando o algoritmo de Mondrian
- **Particiona** o espaço do domínio em várias regiões




k-Anonymity: Comportamento

- Usando o algoritmo de Mondrian
- **Particiona** o espaço do domínio em várias regiões

	ID	QIDs			SA
Tuple#	Name	Marital Stat	Age	ZIP Code	Crime
1	Joe	Separated	29	32042	Murder
2	Jill	Single	20	32021	Theft
3	Sue	Widowed	24	32024	Traffic
4	Abe	Separated	28	32046	Assault
5	Bob	Widowed	25	32045	Piracy
6	Amy	Single	23	32027	Indecency

k-Anonymity: Comportamento

- Usando o algoritmo de Mondrian
- **Particiona** o espaço do domínio em várias regiões




k-Anonymity: Comportamento

- Usando o algoritmo de Mondrian
- **Particiona** o espaço do domínio em várias regiões

		QIDs		Non-SA	SA
Tuple#	EQ	Marital Stat	Age	ZIP Code	Crime
1	1	Single,Separated	(23-30)	32042	Murder
4		Single,Separated	(23-30)	32046	Assault
2	2	Single,Separated	[20-23]	32021	Theft
6		Single,Separated	[20-23]	32027	Indecency
3	3	Div.,Wid.,Married,Remarried	[20-30)	32024	Traffic
5		Div.,Wid.,Married,Remarried	[20-30)	32045	Piracy

k-Anonymity


- Oferece proteção contra **divulgação de identidade**
- Não impede a divulgação dos **atributos**
- Se **múltiplas versões** dos dados são divulgadas, coordenação é necessária
- **Background knowledge**



Broadway Boogie-Woogie

Refinamentos do k-Anonymity

- l -diversity
- t -closeness
- β -likeness
- Exige **variabilidade** nos atributos sensíveis



Broadway Boogie-Woogie

Casos de uso do k-Anonymity

- [Haveibeenpwned](#)
 - [Validating Leaked Passwords with k-Anonymity](#)
 - [Cloudflare, Privacy and k-Anonymity](#)
- [Okta's PassProtect](#)


Casos de uso do k-Anonymity

- [Haveibeenpwned](#)
 - [Validating Leaked Passwords with k-Anonymity](#)
 - [Cloudflare, Privacy and k-Anonymity](#)
- [Okta's PassProtect](#)



Differential Privacy

- Análise de dados que preservam privacidade
- **Não é um algoritmo**
- É uma **definição formal** de privacidade
- Extrair os conhecimentos/informações da base de dados
- Sem extrair informações sobre os indivíduos na base de dados



Differential Privacy

- **Negação plausível** da presença do indivíduo em uma base de dados


$$\Pr[\mathcal{M}(x) \in \mathcal{S}] \leq \exp(\varepsilon) \Pr[\mathcal{M}(y) \in \mathcal{S}] + \delta,$$

\mathcal{M} é um mecanismo aleatório que fornece ε -differential privacy para todas as base de dados


Differential Privacy

- Medida de **perda de privacidade** ϵ (**budget de privacidade**)
- Ajusta a "quantidade de privacidade"


Budget $\epsilon = 0.1$



Uma consulta com
 $\epsilon_1 = 0.02$



Múltiplas consultas



Desafios

- Usabilidade para **não especialistas**
- **Suporte** para consultas SQL

Mecanismos


Mechanism	Strengths
Laplace Mechanism	Simple counts
PINQ	Counting and histogram queries
Elastic Sensitivity	Queries with joins
Sample & Aggregate	Statistical Estimators
Restricted Sensitivity	Graph analysis

Desafios

- Usabilidade para **não especialistas**
- **Suporte** para consultas SQL
- **Integração** com diferentes tipos de base de dados
- Lei fundamental da recuperação de informação
- Poucos exemplos do **mundo real**

Benefícios

- Proteção contra **riscos arbitrários**
- **Quantificação** da perda de privacidade
- Aplicações promissoras na área de machine learning
- Usado por Microsoft, Google, Apple, Uber, etc




[The Mac Observer](#)

ANDY GREENBERG

SECURITY 09.15.2017 09:28 AM

How One of Apple's Key Privacy Safeguards Falls Short

Apple has boasted of its use of a cutting-edge data science known as "differential privacy." **Researchers say they're doing it wrong.**



Dataflow analysis & differential privacy for SQL queries

sql

45 commits 1 branch 0 releases 2 contributors MIT

Branch: master New pull request Create new file Upload files Find File Clone or download

Table with commit history: Noah Johnson small improvements, src small improvements, .gitignore Initial commit, LICENSE Initial commit, README.md update readme, pom.xml update to Calcite 1.15

Dataflow analysis & differential privacy for SQL queries

sql frankmcsberry / blog Watch 221 Star 1,293 Fork 129 Code Issues 4 Pull requests 1 Projects 0 Wiki Security Insights

45

Branch: master blog / posts / 2018-02-25.md Find file Copy path

Jim Klucar typo fixes 257215c on Feb 28, 2018 1 contributor

213 lines (114 sloc) 28 KB Raw Blame History

Uber's differential privacy .. probably isn't

Today we are going to talk through a recently accepted VLDB paper, Toward Practical Differential Privacy for SQL Queries. This paper is partly what is behind Uber's SQL differential privacy project, which they have been happily plugging.

Despite what you might guess, I actually think there is a fair bit to like in the goal of the paper, specifically what is implied by its title, and some of the technical development. The world could use more people aimed at the task of providing differential privacy to people who do not have their own advanced degree in differential privacy, and the framework in this paper is a fine zero-th step.

MIT one or download c on Mar 20, 2018 2 years ago 2 years ago 2 years ago 2 years ago 2 years ago

uber / sql-differential-privacy

Watch 26

Unstar 308

Fork 48

Code

Issues 5

Pull requests 0

Actions

Projects 0

Wiki

Security

Insights

google / differential-privacy

Watch 54

Unstar 1,238

Fork 100

Code

Issues 0

Pull requests 0

Actions

Projects 0

Wiki

Security

Insights

No description, website, or topics provided.

4 commits

1 branch

0 releases

0 contributors

Apache-2.0

Branch: master

New pull request

Create new file

Upload files

Find File

Clone or download

Differential Privacy Team and dasmdasm Changes: ...

Latest commit 7c89b65 7 days ago

differential_privacy

Changes:

7 days ago

BUILD

Project import

19 days ago

CONTRIBUTING.md

Project import

19 days ago

LICENSE

Project import

19 days ago

README.md

Fix typo on the landing page, and incorrect citation.

17 days ago

No description, website, or t

4 commits

Branch: master

New pull re

Differential Privacy Team a

differential_privacy

BUILD

CONTRIBUTING.md

LICENSE

README.md

README.md

Anonymous Functions PostgreSQL Extension

This subdirectory contains a PostgreSQL extension providing several epsilon-DP aggregate functions. We v as the anonymous functions.

Setup

- Install Postgres 11 using the source code.
 - Source: <https://www.postgresql.org/ftp/source/>
 - Instructions: <https://www.postgresql.org/docs/9.3/install-short.html>

uber / sql-differe

Code Issues

google / differen

Code Issues

No description, websi

4 commits

Branch: master New

Differential Privacy

differential_privacy

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README.md

Royce J Wilson, Celia Yuxin Zhang, William Lam, Damien Desfontaines, Daniel Simmons-Marengo, and Bryant Gipson*

Differentially Private SQL with Bounded User Contribution

Abstract: Differential privacy (DP) provides formal guarantees that the output of a database query does not reveal too much information about any individual present in the database. While many differentially private algorithms have been proposed in the scientific literature, there are only a few end-to-end implementations of differentially private query engines. Crucially, existing systems assume that each individual is associated with at most one database record, which is unrealistic in practice. We propose a generic and scalable method to perform differentially private aggregations on databases, even when individuals can each be associated with arbitrarily many rows. We express this method as an operator in relational algebra, and implement it in an SQL engine. To validate this system, we test the utility of typical queries on industry benchmarks, and verify its correctness with a stochastic test framework we developed. We highlight the promises and pitfalls learned when deploying such a system in practice, and we publish its core components as open-source software.

Keywords: differential privacy, database, SQL

DOI Editor to enter DOI
Received ..; revised ..; accepted ...

a population without revealing too much about individuals is a long-standing field of research. The standard definition used in this context is differential privacy (DP): it provides a formal guarantee on how much the output of an algorithm reveals about any individual in its input [10, 11, 14]. Differential privacy states that the distribution of results derived from private data cannot reveal “too much” about a single person’s contribution, or lack thereof, to that data [12]. By using differential privacy when analyzing data, organizations can minimize the disclosure risk of sensitive information about their users.

Query engines are a major analysis tool for data scientists, and one of the most common ways for analysts to write queries is with Structured Query Language (SQL). As a result, multiple query engines have been developed to enable data analysis while enforcing DP [2, 21, 26, 33], and all of them use a SQL-like syntax.

However, as we discuss in Section 2, these differentially private query engines make some implicit assumptions, notably that each individual in the underlying database is associated with at most one database record. This does not hold in many real-world datasets, so the privacy guarantee offered by these systems is weaker than advertised for those databases. To overcome this

308

Fork 48

1,238

Fork 100

Extension

DP aggregate functions. We v

uber / sql-differe

Code Issues

google / differen

Code Issues

No description, websi

4 commits

Branch: master New

Differential Privacy

differential_privacy

BUILD

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README.md

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Differentially Private SQL with Bounded User Contribution

Abstract: Differential privacy guarantees that the output does not reveal too much information present in the database. While private algorithms have been investigated, there are only a few contributions of differentially private existing systems assume that data is associated with at most one database record, which is not realistic in practice. We propose a method to perform differentially private queries on databases, even when individuals contribute with arbitrarily many rows. We introduce an operator in relational algebra to enforce DP in SQL engine. To validate this system, we use the quality of typical queries on industry benchmarks, and verify its correctness with a stochastic test framework we developed. We highlight the promises and pitfalls learned when deploying such a system in practice, and we publish its core components as open-source software.

Keywords: differential privacy, database, SQL

DOI Editor to enter DOI
Received ..; revised ..; accepted ...



too much about individuals in the context of research. The standard definition of differential privacy is based on how much the output of a query reveals about any individual in the database. Differential privacy states that the output of a query on private data cannot reveal more than a person's contribution, which is bounded. By using differential privacy, organizations can minimize the amount of sensitive information about

individuals is revealed. This is a common way for analyzing data in a structured Query Language (SQL). As a result, multiple query engines have been developed to enable data analysis while enforcing DP [2, 21, 26, 33], and all of them use a SQL-like syntax.

However, as we discuss in Section 2, these differentially private query engines make some implicit assumptions, notably that each individual in the underlying database is associated with at most one database record. This does not hold in many real-world datasets, so the privacy guarantee offered by these systems is weaker than advertised for those databases. To overcome this

308

Fork 48

1,238

Fork 100

Extension

DP aggregate functions. We v

Preocupações ao anonimizar datasets

- Dados não ser **completamente anonimizados** e se manter **úteis**
- **Re-identificação** não é o único risco
- Consultas em **grandes datasets** não garantem privacidade
- **Auditoria** de consultas nem sempre é viável

Concerns when anonymizing datasets

- Divulgar **somente estatísticas** não é seguro
- Divulgar **fatos ordinários** pode ser problemático
- **Segurança** não quer dizer privacidade

Obrigada!

Perguntas?

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- The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy [\(here\)](#)
- Differentially Private SQL with Bounded User Contribution [\(here\)](#)
- Differential Privacy at Scale: Uber and Berkeley Collaboration [\(video\)](#)
- Tutorial: Differential Privacy and Learning: The Tools, The Results, and The Frontiers [\(video\)](#)
- Keeping Your Data Secure While Learning From It - Andreas Dewes and Katharine Jarmul [\(video\)](#)
- 9 Data Anonymization Use Cases You Need To Know Of [\(here\)](#)
- The Definition of Differential Privacy - Cynthia Dwork [\(video\)](#)
- Protecting Personal Data with Django (because it's the law) [\(video\)](#)
- Pseu, Pseu, Pseudio. Pseudonymization in Django. by Frank Valcarcel [\(video\)](#)
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- Apple Releases Details on Differential Privacy, and the Big Takeaway Is Which Emoji Is Most Popular [\(here\)](#)
- Differential Privacy In Action [\(here\)](#)

Other differential privacy projects

- <https://github.com/google/rappor>
- <https://github.com/prashmohan/GUPT>
- <https://github.com/LLGemini/PINQ>
- <https://github.com/ektelo/ektelo>